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Abstract 
In the 21st century, Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) have 
become increasingly joint service efforts. The concept of a single materiel 
solution that can meet the requirements of multiple services is the fundamental 
principle of joint programs, with a concurrent objective of attaining economies of 
scale. But this trend has also led to expanding program complexities and 
interdependencies. The resulting cost, schedule, and performance risks often 
counterbalance, and potentially outweigh, the efficiencies gained through inter-
service program designs. Even more important, perhaps, are the eventual, less 
obvious costs to attain unmet service requirements across a broader portfolio. 
We define these risks as the costs of commonality. Such costs are unquantified 
in cost–benefit and cost-informed trade analyses. Thus, they remain concealed in 
the defense acquisition process. Additionally, in order to capture these hidden 
costs, we propose a unique cost-effectiveness model that examines the value of 
joint programs from a broader portfolio perspective. We apply this Joint Value 
Model to the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) program as a case study to 
validate the concept. We conclude from our analysis that the Joint Value Model 
has useful applicability for assessing value in joint and intra-service MDAPs. It 
provides a means for managers to evaluate cost-effectiveness in the portfolio 
context and compare meaningful differences among program alternatives. We 
recommend use of this model as a tool for program analysis at all stages of 
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I. The Value of Commonality 
Parts standardization, or commonality, is a fundamental element of lean 
production for economic benefits. The practice extends to purchasing, overhead, 
manufacturing processes, support equipment, and tools, with every cost savings 
at even the lowest levels of parts and raw materials going straight to the bottom 
line of profitability. In the initiation of a product line commonality strategy, either a 
zero-based approach (bottoms up) or a parts reduction (top down) approach can 
be used. While the zero-based approach adds and uses only parts and modules 
deemed to be needed in terms of requirements, features, or parts functionality to 
a product design, the parts reduction approach instead seeks to reduce from an 
existing list and is thus more difficult or time-consuming to implement. 
Economic benefits are especially realized when volumes are extremely 
large, such as in the automotive industry. Beginning in 2007, Ford Motor 
Company famously undertook a consolidation from 27 core platforms to a target 
of just nine in 2016 to leverage the company’s global assets (Ford Motor 
Company, n.d.). Such part-type reduction benefits extend to not only spares 
inventory but diagnostics, maintenance, and even training of operators and 
maintainers.  
The strategy is not without risk, however, because different product lines 
may require different tolerances and strengths to avoid component failure risk. 
Parts commonality also seems to be somewhat time-dependent. The initial 
pursuit of product line parts commonality often devolves into design divergence 
(reduction of commonality) as products evolve through development into final 
configuration, stemming from differences in the products’ market positioning and 
their timelines for completion. It has also been realized that savings from 
predominantly common low-cost parts can be more than offset negatively by 
major subcomponents that are not common, and likewise shown that the lure of 
modularity and the benefits of standardization can often fail to emerge. 
Modularity often constrains form, fit, and function of components to a single, 
standard interface, and whether involving common modules of hardware or 
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software, unintended interactions can occur as complexity grows. Design 
modifications and standards continuously evolve, coupled with an often sporadic 
demand upon release. Thus, benefits after initial provisioning can become 
smaller over the product life cycle.  
Scaling up the positive aspects of this principle brings the concept of joint 
systems for use across the military services performing similar roles. Fleet 
commonality cost savings are envisioned as coming from spares provisioning, 
crew training, maintenance support, fault identification, and support equipment. 
Through the last century, as Department of Defense (DoD) sought joint service 
integration in its weapon systems in hopes of achieving economic benefits from 
multi-use platforms and parts commonality, many promised benefits have failed 
to arrive. Several others have noted that, in some ways, the Defense Department 
represents three niche markets derived from their distinct and unique operating 
environments. 
Still a growing trend in defense acquisition, and required by DoD 
regulations, joint programs have revealed expanding program complexities and 
interdependencies. Brown (2011) made important distinctions between joint 
acquisition program effectiveness versus efficiency. Joint service acquisitions 
have been shown to involve more stakeholders, often having diverging and/or 
competing requirements, adding to program interdependencies and resulting 
scale of complexity. Further, these conflicting objectives have led to difficult and 
contentious tradeoffs, diffused authority, negotiated budget arrangements, 
complex project management structures, and so forth. This increased 
interdependence is generally reflected in greater transaction costs, that is, higher 
“coordination costs” from increased complexity and uncertainty. But the 
persistent intuitive rationale is that the benefits of inter-service commonality will 
outweigh the costs when properly executed. 
The pursuit of joint capabilities has become increasingly emphasized in 
the 21st century. Materiel solutions are required to facilitate joint capabilities in 
the operational environment, which has driven an increasing need for jointly 
developed defense acquisition programs. However, a review of joint Major 
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Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) in the DoD reveals a history of extensive 
cost growth, schedule overruns, and performance shortfalls. These 
consequences may result in part from the innate complexity of pursuing 
commonality on a very large scale across multiple roles and missions. In 2010, 
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) argued that many of the 
requirements for joint programs such as sharing domain information, business 
processes, technology, legal restrictions, and cultural barriers all impede the 
ability to benefit from joint capabilities.  
The decision to pursue a joint program begins with a cost–benefit analysis 
(CBA) to recommend the pursuit of a materiel or non-materiel solution to an 
identified capability gap in order to best meet an established capability need, 
followed by an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) (cost–benefit analysis) to ensure 
that joint commonality is considered as the preferred solution. As the program 
evolves, managers consider tradeoffs through a process of Cost Informed Trades 
Assessment (CITA). Despite these rigorous and iterative processes, 
underperformance remains prevalent in joint DoD MDAPs. We suspect that 
analyses might fail to account for inherent complexity risks, which often diminish 
or outweigh the economic and operational benefits of commonality in joint 
programs, but this is not the basis for our research. In the course of multi-
stakeholder compromise to seek a joint service solution, we have observed 
eventual divergence into multiple products to satisfy the unmet requirements of 
the compromise solution. The incremental costs of these products eventually 
comprise the less obvious expense, across a broader portfolio, of having pursued 
commonality. We define this consequence as the greater “cost of commonality.” 
In order to reveal and assist in capturing these hidden costs, we take a unique 
approach to evaluating cost-effectiveness by proposing a model that examines 
the value of joint programs from a broader portfolio perspective. Our complete 
technical report can be found at 
http://www.acquisitionresearch.net/files/FY2016/NPS-AM-16-002.pdf. 
In a specific area of defense materiel, specifically mobile combat 
platforms, we observe that inherent tensions exist among requirements for 
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combat agility, which are driven by transportability and mobility needs, and 
requirements for combat power, which are defined in terms of force protection 
and lethality. As such, the breadth of user requirements can be arrayed on a 
continuous agility-powered spectrum, in which the attainment of functionality on 
one end often necessitates tradeoffs on the opposite end. Joint and intra-service 
programs seek to incorporate a broad range of requirements on this spectrum 
with a common system or family of systems. However, programs often 
experience scope contraction over time as the range of included requirements 
narrows due to conflicts, design trades, affordability concerns, and so forth. Such 
contractions expose capability gaps in the force as peripheral requirements 
which are left unmet by the common system. This generates negative 
externalities in the broader capabilities portfolio, which eventually manifest as 
portfolio costs to address unmet requirements with other systems. As a case in 
point, our analysis reveals significant scope contraction in the Joint Light Tactical 
Vehicle (JLTV) program over the course of development. We observed that 
decisions to divest of several JLTV requirements were necessary and 
appropriate from the program perspective, but resulted in reduced cost-
effectiveness in the portfolio context.  
Our proposed cost-effectiveness model, which we term the Joint Value 
Model, seeks to capture these costs by evaluating the program in a portfolio 
context. We reason that by including potential externalities in program 
assessments, the model can provide a means for better-informed decisions, 
resulting in improved cost-effectiveness in DoD acquisition portfolios. In order to 
validate the Joint Value Model as a concept, we apply it to the JLTV program as 
a case study. Our principal intent is not to evaluate the JLTV program 
specifically. Rather, our goal is to assess the usefulness of the model as a tool 
for capturing the un-monetized costs of commonality to facilitate more 
comprehensive analysis in joint programs for evaluating alternative courses of 
action throughout the development process. 
While the scope of this project includes only one expository case study, 
we conclude from our analysis that the Joint Value Model may have applicability 
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in the assessment of other large joint and intra-service programs. Incorporation 
of the Joint Value Model requires something of a paradigm shift with respect to 
how programs are presently assessed and funded. It allows managers to 
compare meaningful differences among program alternatives and assess value 
within capability portfolios. We also conclude that the model is scalable in nature. 
It offers a means to compare value assessments among different portfolios, 
informing funding decisions at the highest levels. 
A.  Benefits of Commonality 
The economic concept of division of labor, to the extent it can be 
achieved, generates a proportional increase in productivity (Smith, 1775). This is 
the concept for economies of scale, which defines the improvements in efficiency 
that result from increased production volume. The automotive industry has been 
one of the greatest beneficiaries of this principle. However, these commonality 
benefits are not easily transferrable to the defense industry. Even for platform-
centric systems like the JLTV, economies of scale are limited by relatively small 
quantities (49,550 vehicles from 2015 to 2035 with four variants). In comparison, 
the Ford Motor Company (2014), which continues to decrease its overall number 
of global platforms, reported global sales volumes of 5.6 million to 6.3 million 
vehicles from 2012 to 2014. 
The automotive industry relies on a competitive market that allows 
consumers to choose among several automakers. Consumer selectiveness is 
tempered, however, by a market dominated by the few players who can achieve 
significant economies of scale in order to provide cheaper goods. When those 
economies of scale are not realized, as was the case of the U.S. auto market 
“Big Three,” during the 2008–2010 auto crisis, it no longer becomes beneficial or 
profitable to produce goods with common parts. Specifically, fuel-inefficient sport 
utility vehicles and pickup trucks, which had previously flourished under General 
Motors, Ford, and Chrysler, were no longer in high demand, and thus no longer 
profitable (Vlasic, 2011). Ultimately, economies of scale rely on production 
quantities, and hence, overall purchase quantities must still be a consideration 
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for military procurement. Even with a planned buy of over 3,000 Joint Strike 
Fighter aircraft, the RAND Corporation determined that, once developed, 
manufacture by more than one producer would not yield cost efficiencies (Birkler 
et al., 2001). 
While the military may not benefit greatly from high production volumes, 
there are shared operational and economic benefits when U.S. forces conduct 
joint operations. The cost savings of supporting and maintaining the equipment 
and vehicles of multiple services with a common logistical trail is substantial. 
Logistically burdensome items, such as tires, fuel, batteries, tracks, engines, and 
transmissions, tend to dominate bulk storage, creating a tremendous footprint 
and driving up life cycle costs (Held, Newsome, & Lewis, 2008). Common 
logistics warehouses and distribution centers that support system sustainment 
are important mechanisms for lowering costs. Further, inter-service commonality 
generates operationally synergistic effects in the joint environment. Here, DoD 
organizations achieve greater efficiency through higher system interoperability, 
resulting in improved combat effectiveness.  
Commonality also provides training benefits to operations and 
maintenance personnel. Specifically, when commonality is implemented in the 
design phase, common components can reduce training demands for operators 
and armament crews if the components or systems they intend to replace are 
relatively complex (Held et al., 2008). Increased commonality also leads to a 
reduction in the number of specialized operators necessary for equipment. In the 
airline industry, budget carriers such as Southwest Airlines and Ryanair have 
accomplished this by operating a single airframe (Treacy & Wiersema, 1995). 
This reduces the amount of training and the number of specialized licenses 
required. In the military, such consolidation strategies can result in fewer 
necessary certifications and potentially fewer military occupational specialties 
needed for operators and maintainers (Held et al., 2008). 
Risk pooling is a further advantage of commonality (Chopra & Meindl, 
2001). By combining the funds of multiple services, the DoD can disperse 
programmatic risk while permitting access to greater resources. By expanding 
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the scope of stakeholders, joint programs broaden the operational, economic, 
and political consequences of failure. This raises the priority and visibility of a 
program, often ensuring its survival in the wake of budget fluctuations. 
Regardless of program performance, vested stakeholders will inevitably act to 
secure interests and prevent organizational failure.  
Finally, commonality within a system or family of systems can provide 
reduced research and development (R&D) costs when deliberately implemented 
with a zero-based approach from early design stages. Ultimately, if the 
components of a new system consist of items within the existing inventory, R&D 
costs for that component are reduced to zero (Held et al., 2008). For the military, 
while common engines and transmissions may or may not be feasible to reuse 
during development, the utilization of existing compatible test equipment and 
maintenance facilities become significant cost savers. 
B.  Costs of Commonality 
The costs of commonality manifest in numerous ways but derive 
principally from the innate complexities that pursuit of large-scale programs 
demand. The DoD is often pursuing joint solutions without full regard of the 
associated risks of these complexities. The defining nature of program jointness 
is the resulting interdependencies among stakeholders, funding, and other 
programs for enablement or interoperability, for example (Brown, 2011). This 
paradigm is not unique to defense acquisitions. Where possible, managers seem 
to attain most success when they limit project scope and partition objectives into 
projects of manageable scale (Flyvbjerg, Buzelius, & Rothengater, 2003).  
The field of behavioral science is useful in explaining the rational choices 
of stakeholders as members of interdependent networks. As environmental 
complexity increases, the ability of an organization to optimize performance 
decreases. In a simplistic environment, such as a single-service or single-branch 
acquisition program, the organization requires no utility function or complicated 
algorithm to determine the best course of action. As the number of competing 
goals increases, the ability of an organization to maximize need-fulfillment 
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through a process of optimization diminishes. It is most often replaced with 
compromise or satisficing—a solution that permits the satisfaction of all needs at 
a minimum specified level. Ultimately, common denominators among diverse 
requirements may not exist or may exist only in rudimentary form. Thus, 
organizations should be skeptical of elaborate mechanisms to find converging (or 
joint) solutions (Simon, 1956). As such, the effort required to achieve incremental 
improvements in optimization is extensive and costly, if productive at all. 
Early on, conceptual designs for complex systems in industries such as 
aviation, satellites, automobiles, and semiconductors often exhibit high degrees 
of commonality. However, as designs progress, small alterations force a 
continual drift away from commonality, a phenomenon termed “divergence.” The 
net effect of divergence can be substantial; intended commonality across large 
subsystems can devolve into commonality only among low-level and low-cost 
components. There are multiple contributing factors. Commonality breaks down 
as user needs evolve and refine, standards change, development teams fail to 
adequately coordinate and synchronize, and new technologies become 
integrated into the system. These factors are most prevalent and consequential 
in projects with greater complexity and economic scale, such as joint MDAPs. To 
mitigate divergence and extract the benefits of commonality, managers have 
been advised to emphasize four concepts. First, shift organizational focus from 
individual products to product families and modify the development process 
accordingly. Second, align incentives toward beneficial commonality rather than 
individual products and requirements. Third, actively manage commonality 
throughout the life cycle of the product family. And finally, so that commonality is 
not pursued as an end in itself by considering the associated tradeoffs and 
consequences in all business and production decisions (Boas, 2008).  
The pursuit of commonality in large-scale programs may also diminish 
product value to the user. In the commercial market, design configurations with 
commonality are desirable when net savings in design and manufacturing 
accrue. However, such designs can hinder the ability to extract price premiums 
though product differentiation. This can manifest as a real or perceived value 
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disparity. Thus, substantial coordination among design, manufacturing, and 
marketing departments is critical to evaluating the profitability of common 
configurations and informing sound business decisions (Desai, Kekre, 
Radhakrishnan, & Srinivasan, 2001). While revenues and profitability are not the 
objectives of defense acquisition programs, the commonality–differentiation 
tradeoff is a transferable principle. Product utility, or value, with respect to the 
warfighter diminishes when common solutions fail to address diverse needs 
adequately. As sometimes occurs, the more functions that a common, “one size 
fits all” system can perform to some degree, the less effective it turns out to be at 
a distinct function. This induces suitability concerns in the operational 
environment if development efforts do not adequately incorporate the user 
community and maintain discrete priorities. The balancing act in the design “trade 
space” becomes a challenge indeed.  
The Tactical Fighter, Experimental (TFX) stands out as a classic example 
of joint commonality pursuit, then compromise, then withdrawal of support, and 
an eventual result of an inadequately capable F-111A Aardvark (Art, 1968). 
When the commonality of parts falls below a specified threshold, the systems are 
no longer common and may be compromised of needed capability. The program 
is then de-scoped and partitioned into multiple programs. (We see this evolving 
divergence across several joint or mega-system acquisitions—see our full 
technical report for elaboration.) The earlier in the life cycle this decision to 
partition can be made, the greater the costs savings to the program and the 
broader mission area portfolio. It is incumbent upon program leadership to 
present this information to decision-makers early enough in the life cycle to 
facilitate these savings.  
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II. Measuring Cost-Effectiveness in DoD 
Acquisitions 
A.  Current Theory and Practice 
Due to unprecedented government spending in response to the global 
financial crisis, nation-states have been forced to exert extreme discretion when 
allocating scarce resources (Melese, Richter, & Solomon, 2015). Military 
expenditures, as the single largest discretionary item in many national budgets, 
are perpetually at risk of underfunding or defunding (“Military Expenditure,” 
2015). Thus, it is incumbent upon acquisition professionals to provide adequate 
rationale for decisions with respect to resource allocation. The military cost–
benefit analysis (CBA) has become an indispensable tool for acquisition leaders 
to meet this requirement. The general guidelines of the CBA are designed to 
promote the efficient allocation of limited resources via well-informed decisions 
by key leaders of the federal government (White House Office of Management 
and Budget, 1992). The CBA is the recommended technique for formal 
government economic analysis of programs and is directed towards the heads of 
executive departments within the executive branch. Current theories and 
practices for the military CBA from government and academia are outlined in the 
following section. 
An effective CBA depends on accurate cost estimations and affordability 
analyses. The intent of cost estimation is to provide an informed, approximate 
judgment. Within the Department, there are multiple cost organizations at varying 
levels, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and service field 
level components. However, there are a number of limitations in the current 
military CBA process. Some of these are clearly identified but not readily 
susceptible to change. Such limitations include the availability of funds and the 
predictability of appropriations. Defense News identifies Lockheed Martin, 
Boeing, and BAE Systems as the top three U.S. defense contractors in 2014 
(“Top 100 for 2015,” 2015). A review of 2014 annual reports for all three firms 
reveals that the number one risk identified for all corporations was the 
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unpredictability of congressional appropriations (BAE Systems, 2014; Boeing 
Corporation, 2014; Lockheed Martin Corporation, 2014). This external factor is 
among those that are least susceptible to lower level programmatic influence. Yet 
it is still incumbent upon military leadership and program managers to consider 
the consequences of erratic funding, which can change the overall cost-to-benefit 
ratio of a program. Leaders must manage this risk through contingency analysis 
of alternatives with respect to program scope. Ultimately, current CBAs lack a 
consistent and holistic approach for evaluating the undefined costs and benefits 
of programs, particularly in joint MDAPs. 
An alternative, or complementary, approach to the CBA process is a cost-
effectiveness analysis, which compares costs and benefits in situations when 
benefits cannot be easily monetized. An instructive case study of this approach 
was conducted for unmanned aerial systems in 2015 (Everly, Limmer, & 
MacKenzie, 2015). The cost-effectiveness of several aerial platforms was 
analyzed by determining unique measures of effectiveness for different 
platforms, communication payloads, and mission scenarios. Specifically, they 
compared the life cycle costs of 17 platforms and nine communication payloads 
with their capabilities in three scenarios: tactical, long-range, and disaster relief. 
This analysis provided additional framework to decision-makers for the selection 
of aerial platforms by capturing many of the previously un-monetized benefits of 
various alternatives.  
The Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) is another form of cost effectiveness 
analysis and a fundamental step in the DoD process of system development. The 
AoA examines current capabilities with respect to Doctrinal, Organizational, 
Training, Materiel, Leader Development, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy 
(DOTMLPF-P) solutions to determine the most logical alternatives for meeting 
capability gaps. Yet, these approaches, while useful, fail to incorporate the 
inherent costs of commonality, with regard to the partitioning of needs and 
proliferation of products that occur. The relative subjectivity of benefits and often-
ambiguous nature of cost dynamics make value determinations difficult. 
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Consequently, reliable metrics for comprehensive programmatic cost-
effectiveness are unavailable to acquisition decision-makers. 
B.  A New Approach 
The value of a program can be measured by examining the effectiveness 
with which it meets the breadth and depth of user needs. In order for a program 
to meet a specified requirement, it typically must make tradeoffs with respect to 
resources or designs that limit its ability to meet other requirements. Budgetary 
constraints often limit development to a narrow range of objectives, while 
physical realities may prohibit the attainment of competing requirements within a 
common system. The derivation of requirements is the fundamental principle that 
defines the scope of a program. Thus, the goal in all programs is to balance 
competing objectives in order to achieve an optimized capability for broad and 
effective application in the operational environment. As noted, optimization is 
increasingly challenging as the scale of complexity rises. This constitutes the 
fundamental challenge of joint MDAPs to incorporate a diverse range of 
requirements through system commonality. Joint programs emerge when the 
inter-service community assesses the optimal range of inter-service requirements 
to be feasible within a common system or family of systems.  
In commercial industries, a broad array of tradeoff dynamics can influence 
system development. Attributes such as the level of reliability, the extent of 
interoperability, or the amount of production may dictate design parameters. 
While such tensions are applicable in combat systems as well, the nature of the 
expeditionary environment in the context of ground, air, and maritime warfare 
tends to define and distribute critical capability requirements across a broad 
spectrum. On one end, requirements reflect the need for combat agility: speed, 
mobility, transportability, and so forth. On the other end, requirements prescribe 
combat power: lethality, protection, survivability, and so on. This agility–power 
spectrum is ubiquitous in defense acquisitions. The principle is applicable and 
scalable to nearly all combat systems from soldier-carried equipment and 
armored vehicles to fighter aircraft and combat ships. The Army organizes its 
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force structure with respect to this capability spectrum. It optimizes Infantry 
Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT) for combat agility and Armor Brigade Combat 
Teams (ABCT) for combat power. Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCT) offer 
capabilities in the middle range of this spectrum. Within the portfolios of each 
brigade combat team (BCT), the Army seeks to balance capabilities to maximize 
combat effectiveness. 
When a portfolio of systems becomes unbalanced in such a spectrum of 
capabilities, the result is reduced combat effectiveness overall. The U.S. Army 
Training and Doctrine Command’s Capability Manager for the IBCT (TCM-IBCT) 
has identified this imbalance as a critical concern. The ever-increasing weight of 
combat equipment in infantry units has led to an excessive physical burden for 
dismounted soldiers. This has diminished the ability of IBCT units to maneuver 
effectively. TCM-IBCT (2012) cites this concern as the most critical capability gap 
for the formation. Conversely, LTG H. R. McMaster, current commander of the 
Army Capabilities Integration Center, believes that recent trends in maneuver 
portfolios have driven capabilities too far to the agility end of the spectrum in 
many cases. He advocates for renewed emphasis on combat power in ground 
combat systems (Freedberg, 2015). Thus, even within a single service customer 
community, there can be disagreement over the most fundamental of 
requirements. 
1. The Joint Value Model 
To assess the effectiveness with which programs address a broad 
spectrum of user needs, we propose a quantitative evaluation model. Each user 
need is examined individually to determine how many total systems in the fleet 
require that specification. The summation of these needs across users is a 
measure of requirement density, further quantified in numbers of systems. If, for 
example, we array these results on the agility–power spectrum relative to one 
another, the result is a graphical distribution of requirement densities. On this 
spectrum, capabilities specified at the center reflect the most common use-cases 
in the most probable environments while peripheral requirements represent 
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unique capabilities for more extreme or specialized scenarios and missions. 
Therefore, the density graph for a given portfolio (e.g., Ground Combat Vehicle) 
will typically depict a bell-shaped curve resembling a normal distribution (see 
Figure 1). Thus, while a joint or intra-service program will seek to capture the 
broadest possible range of requirements, potential commonality benefits are 
highest at the center of the spectrum where density is greatest.  
 
Figure 1.  Portfolio Requirements Density Curve 
However, we observe that physical, programmatic, and economic realities 
invariably seem to limit the scope of joint programs to a narrower range of user 
needs. Beyond this limit, common systems are inadequate to meet the diversity 
of requirements. Thus, at the periphery of the curve are requirements that must 
be met by other programs or remain unfulfilled (see Figure 2). If a program fails 
to meet the intended range of requirements, these capability gaps constitute 
negative externalities within the broader portfolio. As such, the breadth of 
program scope dictates the economic and operational benefits of product 
commonality. If the scope is broad, production and logistics cost savings will be 
high, but the attempt to incorporate a wider range of requirements may increase 
development costs. If the scope is narrow, the inverse will result, and negative 
externalities will increase. Suitability issues may arise also with more system 
special accommodation in the portfolio that attempts to generally address all 
needs. 
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Figure 2.  Portfolio Requirements Density Curve: Joint Program Scope 
The agility–power spectrum may not fully encapsulate the diversity of 
requirements. Unique specifications will invariably exist in parallel to the 
spectrum, extending this diagram to a multidimensional model. For example, 
reliability, availability, and maintainability attributes will drive resource and 
performance trades across the spectrum. However, such requirements are 
typically not the greatest performance distinguishing characteristics dictating 
program scope. Thus, for the purposes of this study, we project the distribution of 
requirements on a single-dimensional scale, the agility–power spectrum. We 
suggest that effectiveness is a volumetric measurement of requirement density. 
For our two-dimensional model depicted in Figure 2, we define this as the area 
under the requirement density curve. In practical terms, the density of each 
requirement can be measured discretely. Therefore, this model (shown in 
Equation 1) calculates effectiveness (E) as the sum of requirement densities 
across the requirement spectrum, where Dx = the density of requirement x, 
measured in number of systems. 
      (1) 
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The unseen costs of commonality heavily influence program scope. 
Inherent complexities and interdependencies, organizational satisficing, and 
transaction costs contribute to commonality divergence and sub-optimal 
solutions. This affects program boundaries in a meaningful way. In general, these 
consequences act as programmatic constraints, forcing a contraction in the 
breadth of scope over time. The result is reduced product utility from original 
designs. Programs can mitigate scope contraction with increased resource 
investment. Yet, such strategies intensify complexity, resulting in higher marginal 
costs and diminishing returns. Consequently, cost growth and underperformance 
are pervasive in joint MDAPs.  
Traditional methods in CBAs and CITAs define program scope as a 
constant parameter within the context of the program rather than a dependent 
variable as we have described. The initial CBA and AoA establish the program 
baseline for requirement scope. As noted, this scope rarely expands as the 
program evolves but often contracts over time. Programs often divest of 
requirements by reducing the number of product variants. Managers typically 
evaluate these decisions based on programmatic concerns without regard for 
externalities in the broader portfolio. The outcome of a CITA is a new scope 
baseline, against which program success is measured. This practice conceals 
the inherent costs of commonality that contribute to scope contraction. Thus, we 
reason that by incorporating externalities into the analysis, such costs should be 
appropriately considered in the decision-making process.  
It follows that the monetary cost of portfolio externalities for the DoD is the 
program cost of meeting excluded requirements by alternate means. Therefore, 
our model calculates cost (shown in Equation 2) with estimates of Program 
Average Unit Cost (PAUC) for each system developed across the requirement 
spectrum. (The Program Acquisition Unit Cost [PAUC] divides the total 
acquisition expense, including research and development [R&D], procurement, 
and military construction funds, by the total number of planned test and 
operational end items.) The model weights each PAUC based on the total 
number of systems to be produced, or the Acquisition Objective (AO) of each 
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system. Therefore, total cost (C) is calculated as the weighted average of PAUCs 
within the portfolio where Ai = the AO of system i, and Pi = the PAUC of system i. 
                                                                   (2) 
The cost-effectiveness of a portfolio can then be defined as total cost 
divided by calculated effectiveness, or the weighted average of PAUCs divided 
by the sum of requirement densities (shown in Equation 3). It denotes the cost 
per calculated value of utility (or effectiveness). Thus, lower values represent 
better cost-effectiveness than higher values. 
                                       (3) 
The Joint Value Model provides a tool for comparative analysis of program 
alternatives that incorporates the costs of externalities generated by scope 
contraction. We propose that it can be incorporated into analyses at all phases of 
a joint program from inception to production and well into operational 
employment. The model is applicable for use in the initial program CBA to 
develop the appropriate baseline for requirement scope. As the program evolves, 
the model can be particularly useful in evaluating alternatives during CITA. It 
offers the DoD a means to address affordability metrics from a broader 
perspective, thereby capturing the true value of programmatic decisions.  
As an ex-post analysis tool, the model can provide an objective metric for 
measuring an improvement or decline in cost-effectiveness over time. This is the 
calculated difference between cost-effectiveness results at two (or multiple) 
points in time. We theorize that a decline in portfolio cost-effectiveness from 
program initiation to system production is, at least in part, a manifestation of 
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inherent commonality costs. Such differences can be further dissected to isolate 
root causes, which can be related where appropriate in analyses of other 
programs. As a case study, we apply this approach to the JLTV program in order 
to evaluate changes in cost-effectiveness from Milestone (MS) A to MS C. We 
then examine this variance through the lens of academic theory to identify causal 
relationships and draw conclusions, where pertinent, for other joint MDAPs.  
2. Assumptions and Limitations 
The principal assumption of this model is that all specified requirements 
are valid user needs, necessitating materiel solutions to mitigate critical capability 
gaps. In addition, the model is a data intensive construct. We assume that the 
costs of collecting and synthesizing necessary data are negligible in relation to 
the cost savings potential. The value of model results is limited by the accuracy 
and availability of data and cost estimates. Therefore, the degree of confidence 
in data inputs should be taken into consideration by producing multiple model 
variations, accounting for best, most likely, and worst-case scenarios. This 
increases risk visibility for decision-makers.  
The model injects a paradigm shift with respect to program analysis in that 
it requires a broader analytical aperture, with implications for sponsors and 
portfolio managers. Here again, we assume that the costs of any inefficiencies 
associated with this shift are minor, and ultimately negligible, in relation to 
potential cost savings. We also acknowledge that a portion of commonality 
benefits are gleaned during sustainment and are not reflected in PAUC 
estimates. Where possible, Life Cycle Cost Estimates (LCEs) should be used in 
place of PAUCs for all systems in the model. However, the accuracy and 
availability of LCE in early stages of system development are minimal. Therefore, 
life cycle considerations must be applied, in most cases, to broader external 
evaluation criteria. Additionally, the model does not address issues of suitability 
that may reduce system effectiveness. This aspect of the model is examined as a 
binary variable; the program either does or does not meet threshold 
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requirements. In reality, systems designed exclusively for a singular purpose or 
subset of requirements will often provide greater utility to the user for that task.  
Finally, the model does not discount monetary costs with respect to time. 
While the principle of time-value of money is applicable, we reason that any 
delay in projected outlays directly corresponds with a delay in system fielding. 
Thus, budgetary cost savings associated with discounted estimates are directly 
proportional to the operational cost of delaying required capabilities to the 
warfighter. In this way, time is counterbalanced in the model and therefore 
excluded as a decision parameter.  
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III. JLTV Case Study 
A. Program Overview 
The genesis of the JLTV program dates back to a 2005 Army and U.S. 
Marine Corps (USMC) Light Tactical Vehicle Functional Area Analysis. This 
analysis found that the aging Highly Mobile Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle 
(HMMWV) fleet was inadequate to meet many of the new light-wheeled vehicle 
requirements of force protection, survivability, payload, and transportability 
(Grgurich, 2013). The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the JLTV program in 
November 2006 (GAO, 2010). The Army and Marines intended to solicit a 
request for proposal (RFP) for the Technology Development (TD) phase of the 
program as early as October 2007. However, Defense Acquisition Executive 
John Young expressed reservations about the maturity of required technologies, 
writing that “there are several aspects of the strategy that raise doubts about our 
ability to develop and acquire this vehicle fleet in an affordable and timely 
manner” (Sherman, 2007). The revised Army and Marine TD plan was executed 
by RFP in February 2008. The JLTV timeline was delayed again in 2011 when 
the Army insisted on equivalent underbody protection to the Mine-Resistant, 
Ambush-Protected All-Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV; Feickert, 2015a). This 
requirement had a substantial impact on overall divergence of the system from its 
original design. In short, the increased protection requirements drove significant 
weight increases. Most notably, it resulted in elimination of the long wheel-base 
payload Category B variant (Feickert, 2015a). The remaining variants include 
two- and four-passenger designs with sub-variants, supporting add-on armor and 
weapons carrier configurations. Joint Program Office JLTV ultimately awarded 
three Engineering, Manufacturing, and Design contracts in 2012 and one 
production contract in 2015. 
The Army’s vision for JLTV has evolved over time as well. The 2014 
Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy identifies the overall Light Tactical Vehicle 
(LTV) fleet as a multipurpose platform, focusing on light, tactical, protected 
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mobility (U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, 2014). This fleet is specifically 
identified as a mix of HMMWVs, Up-armored HMMWVs and JLTVs. Original 
estimates for the JLTV included an Army plan in which approximately 85,000 of 
its estimated 160,000 HMMWVs would remain in service through 2025 (GAO, 
2010). Revised JLTV acquisition quantities call for the procurement of 49,909 
JLTVs for the Army from fiscal year (FY) 2015 to FY2040 and 5,500 JLTVs for 
the USMC from FY2015 to FY2021 (Feickert, 2015b). The current strategy also 
identifies that there is still a need for MRAP vehicles to meet the current gap in 
capabilities from the HMMWV to the JLTV. Specifically, the MRAP fleet will 
“enable mobility in high threat improvised explosive devise environments, serve 
as key leader vehicles, and provide medical evacuation” (U.S. Army Deputy 
Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, 2014). Additionally, the Maneuver Center of Excellence is 
developing requirements for an ultralight Ground Mobility Vehicle (GMV) and a 
six-passenger Light Reconnaissance Vehicle (LRV) to fill other capability gaps in 
the LTV portfolio that JLTV was unable to meet.  
B. JLTV Cost-Effectiveness 
The JLTV program has experienced significant scope contraction (number 
of included requirements) over the course of its 10-year development, exposing 
peripheral capability gaps in the LTV portfolio and necessitating investment in 
other platforms to meet the breadth of user needs. This has altered portfolio cost-
effectiveness for the DoD. Here, we apply the Joint Value Model to the JLTV 
program in order to analyze this dynamic.  
Our calculations for this case study are based on available data at the 
time of analysis. As external evaluators, we are not privy to all of the relevant and 
most current data pertaining to this assessment. Thus, we acknowledge that the 
accuracy of our calculations is subject to a wider margin of error than should be 
expected for an internal program evaluation. Our intent is not to deliver precise or 
robust measurements for evaluation of the JLTV program, but rather to 
demonstrate a proof of concept with respect to the Joint Value Model. To this 
end, we obtained sufficient data to populate the model and make appropriate 
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calculations for assessment. Much of the collected data represented sensitive 
information, designated For Official Use Only and inappropriate for open release. 
As such, this study provides a descriptive rather than detailed presentation of 
input values. Only derivative values calculated in the model are presented in full. 
Similarly, we distribute relevant key performance parameters (KPPs) as 
appropriate on the agility–power spectrum and calculate requirement densities 
accordingly, but we do not detail the specific nature of each KPP in this study.  
To assess the temporal change in cost-effectiveness, we apply the Joint 
Value Model to the LTV portfolio at two points in time, corresponding with the 
JLTV program at MS A (introduction to Technology Maturation/Risk Reduction 
phase for prototyping, typically followed by a significant advanced development 
phase to fully demonstrate system integration and readiness for production) and 
MS C (low rate initial production). In measuring the requirement density of the 
portfolio, we determined that while individual KPP threshold and objective values 
evolved over time, the individual requirement performance values remained 
relatively consistent throughout advanced development. For example, the most 
dramatic change in KPP values was with respect to underbody protection, as 
described in the preceding section. While this change to increase the level of 
protection had a dramatic impact on the program, it did not change the number of 
vehicles in the fleet requiring underbody protection. Thus, the sum of requirement 
densities, which represents the calculated effectiveness of the portfolio, remained 
unchanged from JLTV MS A to MS C. A constant value for effectiveness will not 
result in all circumstances, and the model does not require this in order to 
produce valid calculations. In many cases, evolving requirements will generate 
new KPPs or alter densities for existing KPPs. We assess that this has not been 
the case for the LTV portfolio. Further, the study includes only those 
requirements that constitute distinguishing characteristics of the platform. 
Requirements for reliability, availability, maintainability, trafficability, and so forth, 
are applicable to all vehicles in the portfolio and are thus excluded from 
consideration.  
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The model incorporates 13 KPPs on the LTV requirement spectrum. KPPs 
at the agility (left) end of the scale represent requirements for rotary-wing, fixed-
wing, and seaborne transportability and deployment, as well as mobility. On the 
power (right) end of the spectrum, KPPs dictate force protection and payload 
capacities for cargo, reconnaissance, heavy weapons, and mission command 
requirements. We derived the density of each KPP by analyzing current tables of 
organization and equipment, Army tactical wheeled vehicle strategies, approved 
and developing capability development documents, and published basis of issue 
plans. These documents provided sufficient data to identify, with reasonable 
confidence, how many vehicles within a formation require each specification of 
configuration. The arrangement of requirement densities on the agility–power 
spectrum reflect a generally bell-shaped distribution, with KPPs at the center of 
the scale exhibiting greatest density (see Figure 3). Using these values, we 
calculated LTV portfolio effectiveness to be 211,812 requirement units. Again, 
this value is not the number of total vehicles needed in the fleet. It is the sum of 
requirement densities for all KPPs in the portfolio as previously defined.  
 
Figure 3.  LTV Requirement Density 
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At JLTV MS A, the Army and USMC envisioned that the JLTV would 
replace a large portion of the HMMWV fleet and assume their associated mission 
roles. The intent was to meet threshold values for all 13 KPPs with multiple 
variants of a common platform. Over the course of development and as a result 
of a program CITA prior to MS B, the services narrowed functional objectives for 
the JLTV to include only the requirements represented as KPP 3-10 in this 
model. The services designated KPP 1-2 and 11-13 to be met with other 
platforms or later unplanned increments of JLTV. Four separate platforms have 
been identified to meet these five remaining KPPs. The GMV is in development 
to meet KPP 1-2, facilitating airborne and air assault operations in the IBCT. This 
vehicle will provide a highly maneuverable and transportable platform to enhance 
tactical mobility for light infantry units. The Army is also currently M-ATVs to 
serve as key leader vehicles across the force. While less maneuverable and 
transportable than the GMV or JLTV, the M-ATV offers greater size, weight, and 
power capacities to facilitate command and control networking (KPP 11), which 
the JLTV is currently unable to integrate. IBCTs also require the LRV to enable 
organic cavalry scout squadrons. This requirement, represented as KPP 12 in 
the model, drives further capacity needs to support equipment and force 
structures specific to the squadrons’ reconnaissance mission. Similarly, KPP 13 
dictates requirements for a battlefield ambulance with equivalent force protection, 
mobility, and transportability attributes to the JLTV. There is no current initiative 
to address the ambulance capability gap. Thus, it remains an unmet requirement 
within the LTV portfolio. The mitigation strategy includes a recapitalization of the 
HMMWV ambulance fleet and fielding of MRAP variants in prepositioned stock to 
facilitate contingency operations. As the designated joint program, JLTV retains 
primacy in the model. This means that where capabilities overlap among 
programs, the model selects JLTV as the assigned solution. For example, GMV 
is required to meet KPP 1-7. However, since JLTV meets KPP 3-10, GMV is 
aligned only with KPP 1-2 in the model. The LTV portfolio structure at JLTV MS A 
and MS C is depicted in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4.  LTV Portfolio Structure at JLTV MS A and MS C 
To calculate portfolio cost, we used current estimates of program average 
unit cost (PAUC) for each relevant program within it. PAUC is defined as total 
program cost (including non-recurring R&D, etc.) divided by the acquisition 
objective (AO), or the total number of systems to be procured. For JLTV, the 
model incorporates reported PAUC values at MS A and MS C. Since JLTV was 
the only designated platform at MS A, this value represents portfolio cost for the 
model at that point in time. For MS C, the model averages PAUC values for each 
program, weighted with respect to their respective AO. The published M-ATV 
PAUC value is also incorporated in the model. The GMV, LRV, and Ambulance 
platforms are in early stages of development and do not have officially approved 
PAUC estimates. We derived these values using available cost estimate data 
and projected procurement quantities. In a more detailed assessment of the 
JLTV using this model, a thorough sensitivity analysis should be included to 
evaluate variability and uncertainty in these values. For the purposes of this 
study, we exclude variability assessments, incorporating one estimated value for 
each PAUC. The calculated portfolio costs for our Joint Value Model at JLTV’s 
MS A (one vehicle planned) and MS C (five different vehicles planned) are 
$250,000 and $433,512, respectively.  
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C. Results and Findings 
With these portfolio values, we calculated the cost-effectiveness of the 
LTV portfolio to be 1.18 at JLTV MS A and 2.05 at MS C. These values represent 
the cost to attain a single value of utility, or effectiveness. In itself, the cost-
effectiveness number holds no useful meaning. However, as a tool for 
comparative analysis, it provides a valuable measurement for evaluating courses 
of action and assessing portfolio value over time. In the LTV portfolio, our 
calculations reveal a decline in cost-effectiveness from JLTV MS A to MS C as it 
became more expensive to deliver required capabilities than originally estimated. 
This can be also viewed as a reduction in portfolio value.  
As a well-managed and successful program thus far, JLTV is an ideal 
case study for analysis. In the course of development, program leadership made 
necessary and appropriate decisions to divest of unattainable requirements and 
unaffordable platform variants. While logical for the program, such decisions 
were made without consideration for the broader portfolio and the potential 
negative externalities imposed. For example, the decision to cancel the payload 
Category B configuration variant that supported LRV and ambulance platforms 
generated capability gaps and unfunded requirements in the portfolio. If the Joint 
Value Model were applied in the decision-making process, it may have afforded a 
better informed analysis of alternatives. The model would have provided the 
means to evaluate portfolio value by estimating the cost of including the variant in 
the program as compared to the cost of externalities in the portfolio as a result of 
exclusion. While inclusion would have increased JLTV PAUC estimates, it may 
have produced a more favorable cost-effectiveness assessment for the portfolio. 
If analysts are able to use life cycle cost estimates to evaluate portfolio cost, the 
model can provide further insight into such alternatives. We can reasonably 
predict that logistical savings through commonality in the JLTV program would 
perhaps make inclusion of the long wheel base variant more attractive from a 
portfolio perspective.  
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The model effectively captures the consequence of scope contraction and 
the hidden costs of commonality. Although a joint MDAP, JLTV experienced 
contraction largely as a result of competing intra-service Army requirements. Yet, 
the model is still useful in assessing the value of jointness in the program. The 
JLTV was able to incorporate USMC-driven requirements for seaborne 
transportability and mobility while achieving Army force protection needs. It is 
unclear to what extent, if any, these requirements drove development cost 
increases or schedule delays. Further, the transaction costs of accommodating 
the bureaucracies of both services in the development process are also un-
monetized in program estimates. Suitability concerns are relevant as well if 
suboptimal solutions result from USMC-unique requirements being 
accommodated. Given the small quantity of procurement for the USMC—10% of 
the AO—even slight cost increases resulting from USMC specifications could 
have a definitive impact on cost-effectiveness. The cost to accommodate 10% of 
the fleet may outweigh the benefits of joint commonality. Here again, the Joint 
Value Model can be applied to evaluate alternatives in the portfolio context and 
determine if a joint solution is the most optimal course of action. 
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IV. Conclusions and Recommendations 
Current military CBAs, and other DoD analyses, fail to account for inherent 
complexity risks, which often diminish or outweigh the economic and operational 
benefits of commonality in joint programs. This cost of commonality, when 
overlooked, leads to sub-optimal program solutions with detrimental effects on 
cost, schedule, and performance parameters. The JLTV case study provides 
initial validation of the Joint Value Model as a mitigation tool for programmatic 
assessment. By capturing the cost of commonality and broadening the aperture 
of analysis, the Model provides a useful methodology to reinforce the current 
suite of analyses and optimize requirement satisfaction. Ultimately, incorporation 
of the Joint Value Model can contribute to more cost-effective solutions and 
greater value in joint capability portfolios.  
Examining requirements through the lens of a portfolio is not a new 
concept. Capability portfolio reviews have yielded the current service-centric 
strategies to include the current Army Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy. 
However, the decisions associated with these strategies tend to be focused at a 
senior executive level and are rarely delegated to a program or project level. 
Additionally, these decisions often have negative impacts for program and project 
leadership when divergence occurs from initial baselines. Current legislation for 
acquisition reform, and its role in the future of the National Security Strategy, 
attempts to address cost overruns and technical risk through several statutory 
changes. Language in the 2016 National Defense Authorization Act proposes 
further empowerment of services and program managers with respective 
penalties to accompany the new authorities. If this legislation is approved, tools 
such as the Joint Value Model may provide program managers with additional 
insight at the portfolio level. While the ultimate decision authority for joint 
programs remains at the DoD level, analysis conducted by the program manager 
has a tremendous impact on the overall success of the program. Our analysis 
indicates that the Joint Value Model has beneficial applicability at all stages of 
program development in assessing alternative courses of action. It is also 
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scalable in nature. A comparison of cost-effectiveness figures among portfolios 
can reveal which investments produce the greatest value with respect to 
warfighter needs. Such analysis can inform budgetary considerations at the 
highest levels.  
We recommend additional research to provide further validation of the 
Joint Value Model construct. The scope of this project incorporates only one 
detailed case study as a proof of concept. While this study suggests the 
usefulness of the Joint Value Model beyond the examined program, follow-on 
research should be conducted to determine the breadth of valid applicability.  
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